



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

the radicals, native and foreign born. Their opposition is because of the disinclination of the American Republic to make the slightest concession to communism. In some cases their dissent is based on the doctrinaire theory that no nation has the right, even by negative action, to question the right of a people to choose any form of social structure and governmental organization that it pleases to elect.

The action by Russia herself, which has "intrigued" Europe and America, is the apparent concession by Lenin and the Moscow Government of a modification of the communistic scheme of social control, enforced hitherto by such drastic, dictatorial methods. He is on record as admitting the need now, if not always, of capitalism, at least in a modified form, if Russia is to be saved from internal economic ruin. That he has at all altered his ideal of the ultimate goal for Russia and the world is not proved. Not until it is proved, by policies for which he will be held responsible so long as he heads the Russian State, will the United States as a government pay attention to any forms of concession which he may make.

The British are not quite in the same position to take a stand for principle. Their labor party and their traders are active in urging an opportunist policy. In the United States no such pressure exists. Moreover, the United States is more conservative in defense of capital and of property than any other nation; and representatives of this conservative majority of the population are now in political control. Nor has the United States distant territories likely to be made radical and revolutionary by propagandists from Russia. And if she had, she might not be willing to accept as truthful such pledges of abstention from propaganda as the Soviet Government has made to Great Britain. The American Intelligence Bureau's agents in Europe and in Asia are sceptical of any such pledges, even the most formal and solemn, which Lenin may make. They have no confidence in his sincerity as a statesman. He will, they say, stoop to conquer; but his goal is and always will be destruction of the capitalistic state. And this however democratic in political form it may be. Similar distrust of socialism in general exists even where it declines alliance with Sovietism.

There is fascination as well as profound significance in the differing attitude of Great Britain and the United States toward Russia at the present time. History and tradition and coming economic rivalries should make Great Britain the critic, not the United States, with whom Czaristic Russia always was especially friendly. But events have so turned of late that the western democracy is now more hostile to the nascent communistic state than is the British empire.

CHINA AND "SELF-DETERMINATION"

CHINA's memory of her political, diplomatic, and financial intercourse with Europe is not of a kind to make her love either the Caucasian or his ethics. For the United States she has a much kindlier feeling, and this despite the Shantung provision of the Versailles Treaty. That is a recent incident, while antecedent to it has been a record Christian and fraternal in the main, and having its finest concrete expression not in the Lansing-Ishii compact between the United States and Japan, but instead in the "Open-Door" policy of John Hay and in the long-continued benign and self-sacrificing lives of missionaries and educators who have labored for and with the makers of a "New China."

During the past month the world has been given the text of the correspondence between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan anent the international consortium for financing China's internal development. It is by no means certain at this writing that this compact ever will become operative. The "nationalistic" spirit of Young China may defeat it. But there is this to be said about the compact to which the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan have agreed, namely, that it registers a long step upward and forward. Steadily, but surely, as the correspondence with Japan by Secretary Lansing and Earl Curzon discloses, Japan, at least formally, has been compelled to eliminate special claims in particular spheres of interest in China. On this basis, and this basis alone, Secretary Hughes, speaking for the new administration, has assented to a test of the plan, in the following important words:

"I am happy to advise you that the principle of this co-operative effort for the assistance of China has the approval of this government, which is hopeful that the consortium constituted for this purpose will be effective in assisting the Chinese people in their efforts toward a greater unity and stability."

Earl Curzon, speaking for Great Britain, as far back as August, 1919, in urging recession by Japan from her demands for special privileges should she join the consortium, said:

"This object cannot be achieved unless all parties to the scheme agree to sacrifice all claim to enjoy any industrial preference within the boundaries of any political sphere of influence."

Why, in the last analysis, Japan finally decided to play the game impartially hereafter we will not attempt to say. Her motives may have been pure or mixed. She has deep-rooted ambitions for primacy on the Asiatic continent, which run counter to this pledge. Her critics say that already she has treated the consortium pact as a "scrap of paper."

That is not the point we are emphasizing now. The

important fact is that the Wilson administration, ere it died, and the Harding administration, newly born, backed, and now endorse, a policy to which Great Britain and France adhere, by which some of the worst features of foreign intrusion on affairs Chinese will cease once the new plan becomes operative. China's right to treatment as a peer has been affirmed and insisted upon. Her fiscal obligations to richer nations are not to be capitalized for imperialistic ends. Such doors as she opens are to be open to all, which is what John Hay asked. In short, she is to have more "self-determination." Last, but not least, the "special rights" of Japan, based on propinquity and likeness of Asiatic origin and habitat, are denied. Imperialistic and militaristic Japan has had a check, which will have a repercussion in Japan favorable to the rising Liberalism that is slowly but surely turning and overturning one of the few dynastic governments of the world.

AN UNFORTUNATE AVERSION

IF A CASE involving a surgical operation be presented to the average man of intelligence, such a man's first instinct would be to send for a surgeon. A serious engineering problem would seem to require the services of an engineer. Infection at the root of a tooth turns one's attention naturally to a dentist. Since a treaty between nations is a legal document, it would seem that lawyers might be profitably consulted when such an instrument is up for consideration. One would naturally expect such simple principles as these to be accepted and acted upon. But not so with Mr. Wilson in Paris. As Mr. Robert Lansing says in his article appearing in the *Saturday Evening Post* under date of March 19, "He [Mr. Wilson] came to Paris without, so far as I know, a definite outline of a treaty with Germany. He did have a draft of a covenant of a League of Nations, but it was a crude and undigested plan, as is evident by a comparison of it with the document finally reported to the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace. He, of course, had his famous fourteen points and the declarations appearing in his subsequent addresses as bases of the peace, but they were little more than a series of principles and policies to guide in the drafting of actual terms. As to a complete *projet*, or even an outline of terms which could be laid before the delegates for consideration, he apparently had none; in fact, when this lack was felt by the members of the American commission they undertook to have their legal advisers prepare a skeleton treaty, but had to abandon the work after it was well under way because the President resented the idea, asserting emphatically that he did not intend to allow lawyers to draw the treaty, a

declaration that discouraged those of the profession from volunteering suggestions as to the covenant and other articles of the treaty. The President, not having done the preliminary work himself, and unwilling to have others do it, was wholly unprepared to submit anything in concrete form to the European statesmen, unless it was his imperfect plan for a League of Nations."

Mr. Lansing tells in his book, "The Peace Negotiations," that Mr. Wilson's prejudice against the legal profession in general was exhibited on more than one occasion during his sojourn at Paris. Indeed, Mr. Lansing found throughout his years of intercourse with Mr. Wilson that he "conformed grudgingly and with manifest displeasure to legal limitations." The writer knew in Paris that Dr. Scott and Mr. Miller, technical advisers in international law, incurred the displeasure of Mr. Wilson because of certain suggestions relative to a "skeleton treaty," and this in spite of the fact that Mr. Wilson at the time had no plan of his own.

In light of the fact that Mr. Wilson attempted once the practice of law, and that he now contemplates that profession as a means of livelihood, one suspects that he must have respect for lawyers. In any event, one must be convinced, in light of the unfortunate fate of the Covenant of the League of Nations, that the advice of a few lawyers would not have been amiss in Paris. Some one has quoted from an ancient number of *Punch* the remark, "Put a lawyer on your horse and he'll soon drive you to the devil." And yet where our legal interests are involved we shall continue for some time to turn to the lawyer. We hold no misguided brief for lawyers; our only contention is that there may come times when they are needed in our business. It would appear that such a time came shortly after November 11, 1918. The aversion to lawyers then we now know to have been unfortunate, to put the thing mildly.

THE CO-ORDINATION of voluntary national health agencies would seem to be a step in the right direction. On the first of May a number of these organizations will take possession of offices in the same building in the city of New York. This movement in the direction of co-operation follows the work of the National Health Council and the Common Service Committee, made up of representatives of various agencies interested in the betterment of health and the prevention of disease in the United States. It is announced that each organization will retain full autonomy, the present step being taken for the purpose of reducing overhead expenses and for co-operation in health programs. Members participating in the enterprise are such organizations as the American Public Health Association, Amer-